On Information Leakage During Secure Verification of Campatibility Between Signals
Sun, W.; Rane, S., “On Information Leakage during Secure Verification of Compatibility between Signals”, Canadian Workshop on Information Theory (CWIT), ISBN: 978-1-4244-3400-8, pp. 75-78, May 2009 (IEEE Xplore)
|MERL Report: ||TR2009-026: Wei Sun, Shantanu Rane
|MERL Contact: ||Shantanu D. Rane|
|Research Area: ||Multimedia|
Bob verifies whether Yn is δ-compatible with Xn upon receiving an encrypted version of Xn over a noisy channel.
We consider a secure verification problem in which Alice wants to verify whether her signal X is compatible with Bob's signal Y, where X and Y are drawn i.i.d. according to a joint distribution p(x,y). The notion of compatibility is defined as the requirement that p(x,y) belongs to a certain set A of allowable joint distributions. For privacy, Alice jointly encrypts and encodes X and transmits the result over a public channel to Bob. Using the information leaked by the encryption algorithm, Bob verifies the compatibility of X with Y. We characterize the minimum information that Alice's encryption and coding algorithm must leak in order to guarantee reliable verification results. Further, we determine the maximum information that Bob can hope to extract about X if he is curious. It is shown that a source/channel separation theorem holds for this scenario.